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Government use policy to achieve certain outcomes. Sometimes the 
desired ends are worthwhile, and sometimes they are pernicious. 
Cross-country regressions have been the tool of choice in assessing 
the effectiveness of policies and the empirical relevance of these two 
diametrically opposite views of government behavior. When govern- 
ment policy responds systematically to economic or political objectives, 
the standard growth regression in which economic growth (or any 
other performance indicator) is regressed on policy tells us nothing 
about the effectiveness of policy and whether government motives 
are good or bad.
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I. Introduction
Government use policy to achieve certain outcomes. Sometimes the de- 
sired ends are worthwhile, as is the case when policy is targeted on re- 
moving market failures. At other times, they are pernicious, as in the case 
when policies aim to create and distribute rents. Cross-country regressions 
have been the tool of choice to date in assessing the effectiveness of pol- 
icies and the empirical relevance of these two diametrically opposite views 
of government behavior. This paper argues that such regressions are un- 
informative about the questions that motivate the analysis. The standard 
growth regression in which economic growth (or any other performance 
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indicator) is regressed on policy tells us nothing about the effectiveness of 
policy and whether government motives are good or bad.
There is a voluminous empirical literature which attempts to estimate 
the effects of economic policy on growth. The typical cross-country growth 
regression takes the form
gi＝α ln yi0＋Zi’β＋γ si＋ε i
where si is a policy variable for country i, yi0 is initial income and Zi is 
a vector of other covariates. Such growth regressions are sometimes 
specified in panel form, with growth and all left-hand side variables 
averaged over 5- or 10-year subperiods. The object of the exercise is to 
obtain an estimate of γ, the impact of policy intervention on growth.  
Regressions of this type are ubiquitous in academic research, as well as 
in policy work carried out by development agencies, where they are used 
to predict the effect of policy reforms.
The list of economic policies that have been included in cross-national 
regressions includes:
∙fiscal policy (Easterly and Rebelo 1993)
∙government consumption (Barro 1991)
∙inflation (Fischer 1993)
∙black market premia on foreign exchange (Sachs and Warner 1995)
∙overvaluation of the exchange rate (Dollar 1992)
∙financial liberalization (Eichengreen 2001)
∙trade policy (Lee 1993)
∙state ownership in industry or banking (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer 2002)
∙industrial policy (Ades and di Tella 1997)
While economic growth is the most frequently used measure of eco- 
nomic performance, sometimes other performance indicators such as pro- 
ductivity and investment are used as the dependent variable. Djankov 
et al. (2002) regress a variety of public goods (ranging from health out- 
comes to product quality standards) on regulations that restrict firm 
entry. Similar regressions are run also across industries or states/regions, 
regressing a performance variable on policies that apply at the relevant 
level. Besley and Burgess (2002), for example, analyze the impact of 
labor regulations on differential growth rates across Indian states.
As the empirical growth literature has grown, so has the critical eval- 
REGRESSING GROWTH ON POLICIES 139
uation of it. There is by now a wide-ranging discussion of the short- 







Temple (1999), Durlauf, Jonhson, and Temple (2005), and Easterly 
(2004) provide very useful recent critical surveys of the empirical growth 
literature. A dominant concern has been the lack of robustness. Levine 
and Renelt (1992) documented a while back that growth regressions are 
generally quite non-robust to variations in the set of conditioning vari- 
ables. Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) have tried to deal 
with this problem by Bayesian averaging of OLS estimates, to see which 
of the standard regressors are robustly correlated with growth. Easterly 
(2004) emphasizes that the large policy effects uncovered in growth re- 
gressions are typically driven by outliers―which represent instances of 
extremely “bad” policies.
The question analyzed here is how to interpret the estimated coeffi- 
cients from such regressions when policies are not random but are used 
systematically by governments to achieve certain ends―whether good 
or bad. So the focus is on the endogeneity of the policy variables inserted 
on the right-hand side of the regression. Endogeneity problems are of 
course nothing new in growth regressions. But what is special here is 
that policy endogeneity is not just an econometric nuisance, but typically 
an integral part of the null hypothesis that is being tested. The supposi- 
tion that governments are trying to achieve some economic or political 
objective is at the core of the theoretical framework that is subjected to 
empirical tests. In such a setting, treating policy as if it were exogenous 
or random is problematic not just from an econometric standpoint, but 
also conceptually.
My point is best made in the context of a specific application. Consider 
as an illustrative example an article by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2002) in which the authors analyze the consequences of gov- 
ernment ownership of banks around the world. The authors begin the 
article by distinguishing two perspectives on the role of government 
banks. The first perspective is a “developmental” one, which they attri- 
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bute to Alexander Gerschenkron. In this view, latecomers resort to state- 
ownership of the financial system to overcome market imperfections, 
mobilize resources, and catch up with advanced countries. The second 
perspective is a “political” one, in which government ownership allows 
politicians to transfer incomes to favored groups in return for their sup- 
port. To discriminate between the two stories, La Porta et al. regress per- 
capita GDP and productivity growth on their measure of government 
ownership of banks (along with other standard regressors). This exercise 
reveals a robust negative relationship between government ownership and 
economic performance. The authors interpret this result as supportive 
of the political view, and inconsistent with the developmental view.
But there is a problem here. The cross-national variation we observe 
in government ownership is unlikely to be random by the very logic of 
the theories that are tested. Under the developmental perspective, this 
variation will be driven by the magnitude of the financial market failures 
that need to be addressed and the governments' capacity to do so effect- 
ively. Under the political motive, the variation will be generated by the 
degree of “honesty” or “corruption” of political leaders. I show in this 
paper that the cross-national association between performance and policy 
will have a very different interpretation depending on which of these 
fundamental drivers dominate. Unfortunately, none of these drivers is 
likely to be observable to the analyst.1 In such a setting the estimated 
coefficient on state ownership is not informative about either the positive 
or the normative questions at stake. It cannot help us distinguish between 
the developmental and political views, because the estimated coefficient 
on government ownership will be negative in both cases. The intuition 
is straightforward: a government that cares about social welfare (and 
nothing else) will increase its policy intervention in response to larger 
market failures, but not so much as to completely insulate economic 
performance from their adverse consequence. A negative correlation be- 
tween government ownership and growth might as well be taken as 
confirmation that governments are acting socially optimally! And under 
no circumstances can it tell us whether societies would be better or 
worse off if government ownership were legislated away (or, for that mat- 
ter, made mandatory).
1 That is why the problem cannot be treated as one of omitted variables (to be 
addressed by adding covariates to the specification) or parameter heterogeneity 
(to be addressed by splitting the sample). La Porta et al. (2002) follow both strat- 
egies.
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A common defense of growth regressions is that despite all their pro- 
blems they help us update our priors about the impact of certain types 
of policies. In the words of Wacziarg, “even simple or partial correlations 
can restrict the range of possible causal statements that can be made, 
and nowhere is this more the case than in the comparative growth lit- 
erature, where causality is especially difficult to establish” (2002, p. 909). 
Consider an illustration from trade policy.2 The estimated coefficient on 
import tariffs in growth regressions run for the contemporary period is 
typically negative (albeit insignificantly so) and rarely positive.3 One fre- 
quently hears the argument that we can at least draw the conclusion 
from this fact that import protection cannot be beneficial to growth. But 
once again this and similar inferences are invalid. A negative partial cor- 
relation between growth and import tariffs is not only consistent with 
protection being growth-enhancing, it is actually an equilibrium conse- 
quence of trade protection being used in a socially optimal fashion.
The discussion on endogeneity in growth regressions has focused on 
outcome variables such as investment and trade ratios, where the con- 
cern has been that such outcome variables may be caused by (or jointly 
determined with) incomes. Surprisingly, there has been relatively little 
discussion of the consequences of policy endogeneity. The surveys by 
Temple (1999) and Easterly (2004), for example, barely pay lip service 
to this issue.4 On the other hand, the microeconomic literature on policy 
evaluation has shown much more awareness of the biases introduced 
by policy endogeneity. For example, it is widely recognized that OLS es- 
timates are unreliable when program placement is correlated with relevant 
features of a locality or determined optimally according to some objective 
function (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986 ). The usual solutions to this 
problem are IV estimation and randomized trials. Neither of these two 
2 Wacziarg (2002) actually gives the example of corruption, arguing that the 
negative coefficient on corruption in growth regressions disproves the view, once 
held by some, that corruption could be a positive force for development. This logic 
suffers from the same problem discussed here. If indeed corruption is a second- 
best mechanism for getting around imperfections in the way that the economy 
operates―which is the argument that used to be made― the association between 
growth and corruption across countries will be negative.
3 Yanikkaya (2003) is one exception.
4 I have to confess that I am far from blameless here. In Rodrik (1998), I re- 
gressed growth on an indicator of capital-account liberalization to see if there 
was evidence that financial opening promotes growth. And in Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001), we critiqued a large body of literature which regresses growth on trade 
policy indicators without mentioning the problem analyzed in the present paper.
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strategies is very promising when we are concerned with the impact of 
economic policies at the level of countries. So it is important to build 
some intuition about how interpretation can go astray when policies are 
selected endogenously.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section lays out a 
simple growth model that allows for policy to affect growth in both de- 
sirable and undesirable ways. The model is built around three unobser- 
vable parameters: ( i) the honesty of the government; (ii) the extent of 
market imperfections; and ( iii) the capacity of the government to inter- 
vene effectively. I next analyze the association between the level of policy 
intervention and growth under varying assumptions about which of these 
unobservables drives the cross-national variation in the data. The final 
section discusses some of the additional implications of the analysis.
II. Modeling the Sources of Cross-National Variation in Policy 
Interventions
We want to analyze the relationship between government policy and 
economic growth allowing for differences across countries in market im- 
perfections, policy objectives, and government capabilities. We consider 
the simplest growth model, which takes the following linear form:
g＝(1－θ )A－ρ
where θ∈[0, 1] is an (unobservable) market-failure parameter, A is pro- 
ductivity, and ρ  is impatience. (We fix the intertemporal elasticity of sub- 
stitution to 1 to avoid carrying around extra parameters.) When θ＞0, 
growth is reduced because of a wedge between social and private returns.
We suppose that the government has a policy tool at its disposal, de- 
noted by s, that can increase private appropriability of the social returns. 
Let such policy intervention by government reduce market failure at 
agency cost ( in growth terms) of φα (s), with α (0)＝0, α ’(s)＞0, and α”(s) 
＞0. φ  is just a shift parameter that allows us to vary “ability” or “policy 
effectiveness” across countries.
So the modified expression for growth can be written as
g (s, θ , φ )＝(1－θ (1－s))A－φα (s)－ρ
For later reference, we define gs(s, θ , φ )＝θ A－φα ’(s). We denote the 
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growth-maximizing level of policy intervention by s**, with s** solving   
gs(s
**, θ , φ )＝0.
A. The Politician's Problem
The politician can have both economic and political motives. We model 
this by assuming that the government cares about both growth (g) and 
the diversion of profits generated by policy intervention. Let the diversion 
function be given by concave and single-peaked function π (s) (with 
π ’(s)＞0 for small s, π ”(s)＜0, π (sp )＝0, and sp＞s**). The relative weight 
placed on growth by the politician is λ  (which is also unobservable, 
with λ∈(0,∞)). The politician maximizes
max u(s; θ , φ )＝λg(s, θ , φ )＋π (s)                   
s
The first-order condition is:
λ gs(s*, θ , φ )＋π ’(s*)＝0
The SOC condition is satisfied when α”(s)＞0 and π ”(s)＜0. Let the in- 
ternal solution to this problem be given by 0＜s*＜1. We have s**＜s*＜sp 
as long as λ∈(0,∞). Therefore π ’(s* )＞0 and gs(s*,θ , φ )＜0. In words, a 
slight reduction in the equilibrium level of s would raise growth and 
increase political diversion.
B. Sources of Cross-National Variation
Countries can differ along many dimensions. We focus here on the 
variation in the following three parameters:
∙λ : the degree to which the government cares about social welfare 
(the “honesty” of the government)
∙θ : the extent to which markets are imperfect (the “need” for inter- 
vention)
∙φ : the capacity of the government to intervene effectively (the “ability” 
of the government)
We will vary each in turn and analyze how the equilibrium levels of s 
and g respond.
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C. Cross-National Variation Generated by λ
We want to know how s* and g co-vary. So we check to see how 
changes in λ  affect each of these endogenous variables.
ds*        gs(s
*, θ , φ )
   ＝－                   ＜0
dλ    λgss(s*,θ , φ )＋π”(s*)
Note that gs(s
*,θ , φ )＜0 in equilibrium (the level of policy intervention is 
higher than the level that would maximize growth) as long as λ  is finite. 
Further the SOC for the politician's problem ensures that the denomin- 
ator is negative in the above expression. Similarly,
dg             ds*
  ＝ gs(s
*,θ , φ )    ＞0
dλ             dλ
Therefore,
dg/dλ                 π ’(s*)
      ＝gs(s
*, θ , φ )＝－     ＜0
ds*/dλ                  λ
So the cross-national association between the policy intervention and 
economic performance is negative (and zero in the limit as λ →∞). 
Note that in this case, the observed correlation between s and g does 
tell us what we are interested in knowing, namely ∂g/∂s＝gs(s
*, θ , φ ). It 
yields the correct answer to the question, how would a small increase 
in s affect g locally? Even though policy is endogenous, we recover the 
partial derivative that is of interest.
However, we are far from being home free. How we actually use this 
information for policy purposes is not entirely clear, since we have as- 
sumed policy is actually endogenous.
Suppose the “policy” question is of the following kind. Countries can 
choose between two policy regimes: ( i) regime A where s is set equal to 
zero, and ( ii) regime B where s is determined in the way presented 
above. Does the empirical finding that ∂g/∂s＜0 allow us to say that 
regime A is preferable to regime B? Obviously not, since it is entirely 
possible that g(s*, θ , φ )＞g(0, θ , φ ) even though the politician is politically- 
motivated and puts less than infinite weight on growth (see Figure 1). 
To be sure that regime A is desirable, we need not only ∂g/∂s to be nega- 
tive but for it to be “sufficiently” negative.
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FIGURE 1
D. Cross-National Variation Generated by θ
Now assume countries differ along a different dimension, the size of 
the market imperfection and the need for policy intervention (captured 
by θ ). We do the same exercise, with variation in θ  this time:
ds*        λA
   ＝               ＞ 0
dθ    λφα”(s*)－π”(s*)
as long as λ＞0 (politician cares at least a little about growth).
dg                   Aπ ’(s*)
   ＝－(1－s*)A－               ＜0
dθ               λφα”(s*)－π”(s*)
Therefore
dg/dθ                     (1－s*)π”(s*)－π ’(s*)
       ＝－(1－s*)φα”(s*)＋                    ＜0
ds*/dθ                             λ
We still get a negative relationship between s and g, even if λ  is very 
large ( that is, even if the politician cares mostly or exclusively about 
social welfare ). In the limit, when the politician puts infinite weight on 
growth (λ →∞), this expression simplifies to 
    dg/dθ                
lim        ＝－(1－s*)φα”(s*)＜0
λ→∞ ds*/dθ 
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which is still unambiguously negative. The intuition is the following: when 
markets become more imperfect, the optimal policy response is to increase 
the level of intervention, but no so much as to fully insulate growth from 
the impact of the increased market imperfection. Consequently, higher 
levels of policy intervention are associated with lower growth rates, even 
though the politician is motivated purely by economic factors.
Therefore, we should actually expect to observe a negative relationship 
between policy interventions and economic performance under the null 
hypothesis that what governments are doing is to respond, in a welfare- 
maximizing way, to market imperfections. Or to put it differently, when 
we observe a negative correlation between interventions and performance 
we cannot distinguish between two diametrically opposed views of the 
world― one in which governments are driven by desirable economic mo- 
tives and one in which they are driven by economically harmful, political 
motives. This result applies to all cross-sectional regressions, whether run 
at the level of countries, regions, or industries.
E. Cross-National Variation Generated by φ
We assume now it is φ  that varies across countries. Look first at the 
effect on the “optimal” intervention: 
ds*         λα ’(s*)
   ＝－               ＜0
dφ      λφα”(s*)－π”(s*)
If policy is less effective, there is less intervention in equilibrium. The 
effect on growth is given by:
dg                     ds*
   ＝－α (s*)＋gs(s*, θ , φ )     
dφ                      dφ
which is of ambiguous sign since α (s*)＞0, gs(s*, θ , φ )＜0 (as long as λ 
is less than infinite), and ds*/dφ＜0. Intuitively, there are two offsetting 
effects here. The direct effect (captured by the first term) is negative, 
since a decrease in the effectiveness of the policy intervention reduces 
growth. But there is also an indirect effect that arises from the induced 
change in s*. An increase in φ  reduces s*, which gives a positive boost 
to growth since s is too high from a growth maximizing standpoint in 
the first place. If we are in an equilibrium where political motivations 
leave us with too high a level of interventions, an increase in the cost 
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of intervention (a decrease in the ability of the government to intervene) 
can increase growth.
The manner in which g and s covary is given by
dg/dφ         λφα”(s*)－π”(s*)   π ’(s*)
       ＝α (s*)                 －        
ds*/dφ             λα ’(s*)         λ 
which is of ambiguous sign for the reason described above.
F. Comparisons
Comparing the three expressions we have obtained on how g and s 
covary under different assumptions about how countries differ, it can be 
shown that:
dg/dθ    dg/dλ     dg/dφ
       ＜        ＜        
ds*/dθ    ds*/dλ    ds*/dφ 
Note that the cross-national variation between g and s is more negative 
when what varies in the background (and differentiates countries from 
each other ) is market imperfections than when it is the honesty/corrup- 
tion of governments. So we are more likely to uncover a strong negative 
correlation between policy intervention and performance precisely when 
policies across countries differ for economic (i.e., good ) rather than pol- 
itical ( i.e., bad ) reasons.
III. Results
I summarize some of the main results of the analysis here:
∙An increase in s is rarely accompanied by a rise in g. The only ex- 
ception is the case where the main variation across countries is in 
the “ability” of governments and governments are not too “dishonest.”
∙This is true even when politician is a social-welfare maximizer and 
is not motivated at all by diversion (λ →∞).
∙No matter how “honest” the government is and how significant the 
“need” for policy interventions, the cross-national relationship between 
s and g will be negative as long as the main source of variation 
across countries is the variation in θ  (“need”) and λ  (“honesty”).
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Therefore, as long as policy interventions are not random and their 
presence responds to unobservables, regressing an economic performance 
variable on policy s is uninformative about the degree to which market 
failures exist, the extent to which policy interventions are targeted on 
them, the effectiveness with which government policies are deployed, or 
the extent to which policy interventions are used to create and divert 
rents for political purposes.
IV. Where Next?
Is there a way out of the conundrum? Should we give up on estimating 
the impact of national economic policies? We can safely presume that 
policy randomization across countries is an unpromising avenue to pur- 
sue: national governments are unlikely to want to be experimented upon. 
What about an instrumental-variable (IV) strategy? The trouble with IV 
is twofold. First, in this area of inquiry it is genuinely hard to find cred- 
ible instruments which satisfy both the exogeneity and exclusion require- 
ments. As Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) point out, growth theory 
is so broad and encompassing that it is always possible to find a story 
about why an exogenous variable belongs as a regressor in the second- 
stage of the estimation (therefore making it invalid as an instrument). 
Plausible instruments are very few indeed. But an equally important 
limitation on IV is that what we are typically interested in knowing is 
the impact of purposeful policy action. We want the answer to the ques- 
tion: when governments have tried to achieve this or that objective, how 
successful have they been at it? The exogenous component of policy, 
even if excludable from the second-stage, can help us answer a different 
question―what has been the impact of policy interventions that govern- 
ments did not adopt purposefully―but it does not answer that particular 
question.
A first step in the right direction is to take the theories that motivate 
our empirical analyses more seriously. Our failure to undertake mean- 
ingful tests often derives from a failure to fully specify the theoretical 
model(s) being put to the test. For example, if we are testing the null 
hypothesis that governments are acting in the public interest, we need 
to specify a model in which governments do precisely that, come clean 
about what we assume is and is not observable, and inquire whether 
the empirical implications of such a model are consistent with the data. 
If we are testing this view against the alternative that they are motivated 
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by private/political interests, we need to be clear about the distinct pre- 
dictions the two models make for the data. Furthermore, whether or not 
the alternative theories generate different predictions, we need to look 
for direct evidence about the channels through which policies are hypo- 
thesized to operate.5 These seem like standard good practice, but it is 
clear that the bulk of the cross-national growth literature proceeds in a 
different manner, assuming that it is enough to plug a policy variable in 
a regression (while perhaps making an honest attempt at instrumenting 
it) in order to answer a whole series of questions about the effectiveness 
of policy and the motives of governments.
(Received 24 February 2012; Revised 10 May 2012; Accepted 11 May 
2012)
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